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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
DANIEL J. NIXON,

'
]

Plaintiff/Appellant,

;
I
G. BARTON BLACKSTOCK, BUREAU
]
CHIEF, DRIVERS LICENSE DIVISION,1
STATE OF UTAH,
]

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

v.

Case No. 930549-CA

Defendant/Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to decide appeals
from district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of
state agencies, see Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (a).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Whether

Plaintiff/Appellant

is

required

to

exhaust

his

administrative remedies by requesting a hearing before the Appellee
Drivers License Division prior to seeking judicial review of the
administrative action of the Appellee.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This case presents a legal issue, and the lower court's
statutory

interpretation

is accorded no deference.

City of

Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah 1990), cert.
denied, 49 U. S. 841 (1990).

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Determinative statutory provisions are Utah Code Ann. § 41-2130 (Supp. 1992), recodified at Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-223 (Supp.
1993), Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-131 (1988), recodified at Utah Code
Ann.

§ 53-3-224

(Supp. 1993), and Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14

(1993) . These are set forth in the Addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the Order of Fourth District Judge Ray
M. Harding dismissing the Plaintiff's Petition for Judicial Review
of the administrative action by the Appellee that suspended the
Appellant's driving privileges.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Appellant was arrested on December 2, 1992 for driving under
the influence of alcohol, and served with Notice that the Drivers
License Division would suspend his driving privileges unless he
requested a hearing on the suspension (R. 22).

It is undisputed

that Appellant failed to request such a hearing and the Drivers
License Division suspended the Appellant's driving privileges for
a one-year period commencing December 31, 1992, as this was
Appellant's second administrative suspension for driving under the
influence

(R. 22) .

Appellant sought judicial review of the

administrative action of the Drivers License Division pursuant to
2

Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-131 (1988) (recodified at § 53-3-224).

The

lower court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction (R.
27), and this appeal followed (R. 30).
Contrary to the Appellant Nixon's assertions in his statement
of facts, there is no evidence of any "actual" reliance on the
Notice that he received or on any statutory provisions as the
reason for his failure to seek an administrative hearing before the
Drivers License Division.

Further, any claim of reliance based

upon the Notice of Agency Action, which told the Appellant how to
seek judicial review, could not have been a factor as Appellant
received that Notice subsequent to his failure to request a
hearing.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Utah Administrative

Procedure Act

requires

that

an

individual exhaust all administrative remedies prior to seeking
judicial review. Appellant failed to request a hearing before the
Drivers License Division, denying the Division the opportunity to
review

his

claims.

This

failure

to

exhaust

available

administrative remedies divests the court of jurisdiction for
judicial review.

3

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED IT LACKED
JURISDICTION BASED UPON APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO
REQUEST A HEARING BEFORE THE DRIVERS LICENSE
DIVISION.
Appellant

sought

judicial

review

of

the

administrative

suspension of his driving privileges pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
41-2-131 (1988).

Judicial review of the administrative suspension

is governed by the provisions of the Utah Administrative Procedures
Act (UAPA), Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-l to -22 (1993). Brinkerhoff
v. Schwendiman, 790 P.2d 587

(Utah App. 1990) .

The provisions

regarding judicial review under UAPA are set forth in section 6346b-14(2), which provides:
2) A party may seek judicial review only after
exhausting all administrative remedies available, except
that:
a) a party seeking judicial review need not
exhaust
administrative
remedies
if
this
chapter or any other statutes states that
exhaustion is not required;
b) the court may relieve a party seeking
judicial review of the requirement to exhaust
any or all administrative remedies if:
(i) the administrative remedies are
inadequate; or
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in
irreparable harm disproportionate to the
public benefit derived from requiring
exhaustion.
Under the statutory provisions relating to administrative hearings
in driver license suspension cases, Appellant had the right and
opportunity to be heard and to be granted a hearing pursuant to

4

Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-130(6) (Supp. 1992), but Appellant admittedly
did not request a hearing.

No "other statute" or the drivers

license statute states that exhaustion is not required.
The exhaustion requirement under UAPA is a codification of the
long-standing law regarding review of administrative actions. As
stated in Tax Comm'n v. Iverson, 782 P.2d 519, 524 (Utah 1989),
[t]he law generally provides that parties must exhaust
applicable administrative remedies as a prerequisite to
seeking judicial review. Exceptions to this rule exist
in unusual circumstances where it appears that there is
a likelihood that some oppression or injustice is
occurring such that it would be unconscionable not to
review the alleged grievance or it appears that
exhaustion would serve no usual purpose.
See also S & G, Inc. v. Morgan, 797 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1990) .
The purpose behind requiring exhaustion of administrative
remedies is to allow the administrative agency, which is charged
with

the

enforcement

of

its

laws,

to

review

and

make

its

determination based upon the facts and arguments presented by all
interested

persons. As

stated

in Maverik

Country

Stores v.

Industrial Comm'n, 860 P.2d 944 (Utah App. 1993):
The basic purpose underlying the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies "is to allow an
administrative agency to perform functions within its
special competence-to make a factual record, to apply its
expertise, and to correct its own errors so as to moot
judicial controversies."
Id. at 947 (quoting Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 37 (1972)),
As also stated in S & G, Inc. v. Morgan;
5

It is well settled under [the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies] that persons aggrieved by
decisions of administrative agencies "may not, by
refusing or neglecting to submit issues of fact to such
agencies, by-pass" them, and call upon the courts to
determine matters properly determinable originally by
such agencies."
797 P.2d at 1087 (quoting People v. Keith Rv. Equip. Co., 161 P.2d
244, 249 (Cal. App. 1945)).
S & G involved an attempted appeal from the administrative
decision, after hearing, of the state engineer.

S & G did not

participate at the administrative level, relying upon participation
of another party with that had a similar interest, but then S & G
sought judicial review of the decision and the other party did not.
The statutory provisions there, similar to the provisions here,
allowed for judicial review by trial de novo by "any person
aggrieved by [the engineer's decision]."

The Utah Supreme Court

dismissed the appeal based upon the failure of S & G to participate
in the agency hearing and processes. To hold otherwise, the Court
pointed

out, would be contrary to the policy

considerations

applicable to all administrative decision-making:
A requirement of participation at agency level "ensures
that those who have an interest will bring to the
agency's attention all relevant facts and considerations
at the time the agency makes its decision. Moreover, the
requirement of participation gives the agency and the
other participants notice of the identity and concern of
interested parties."
Id. at 1087 (quoting Colorado Water Oual. Control Comm'n v. Town of
6

Frederick, 641 P.2d 958, 962 (Colo. 1982)).
Appellant admittedly failed to request a hearing before the
Drivers License Division.

As in Iverson, Appellant's failure to

exhaust administrative remedies
deprived the commission of the opportunity to hear,
analyze, critically review, and possibility correct a
matter
within
the
purview
of
its
particular
responsibility and expertise.
Iverson, 782 P.2d at 526.
Appellant has no right to seek judicial review prior to
exhausting his administrative remedies and without participating in
the administrative processes.

Further, he waived any potential

right to judicial review of the agency's final action by refusing
to participate and request a hearing at the administrative level.
See S & G, Inc., 797 P.2d at 1088.
Appellant places complete reliance upon Heinecke v. Dept. of
Commerce, 810 P.2d 459 (Utah App. 1991), stating that the case
holds that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required.
This case is not controlling for two reasons.

First, Heinecke

involved a different issue - the requirement of a discretionary
further internal administrative review after an administrative
hearing and decision prior to seeking judicial review.

In this

case, the administrative remedy that Appellant failed to seek was
the only administrative review, process and hearing within the
statutory drivers license scheme.
7

The Appellant was served with

the Drivers License Division notice of intention to suspend, see
Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-13 0 (3) (1988).

Upon written request he was

entitled to a hearing, see Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-130 (6) (a) , and a
suspension,

"whether

ordered

or

not

challenged

under

this

subsection," begins on the 30th day after arrest, see Utah Code
Ann. § 41-2-130(7) (1988).

In Heinecke, the agency had held a

hearing in which Heinecke participated, the agency after review
issued its ruling, and Heinecke's omission involved a mere failure
to

request

further

discretionary

administrative

review.

Appellant's inaction here denied the administrative agency any
opportunity to review at a hearing its decision whether to take
action.
The second reason that Heinecke is inapposite is because of
the way it was decided. Heinecke's status and precedential weight
and value was discussed in Maverik Country Stores.

In Maverik,

this the Court "acknowledged" some conflict between the holding
there and Heinecke concerning exhaustion requirements.

The

Maverik Court noted that Heinecke was decided without the benefit
of briefing and that the Court may need to revisit the issue of
exhaustion requirements.

Further, it explicitly stated:

In Heinecke, however, we did not address
the impact of Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(2)
(1989) which provides: "A party may seek
judicial review only after exhausting all
administrative remedies available. . . . "
8

860 P.2d at 948 n.5.
As

noted,

this

case

involves

not

merely

a

further

discretionary review within an agency, but the only administrative
hearing provided by statute. Further, Appellee addresses the issue
concerning the explicit

statutory language of UAPA requiring

exhaustion of all administrative remedies, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b14(2)

(1993),

interpretation

as
of

well
the

as

the

case

law

well-established

exhaustion of administrative remedies.

involving
doctrine

judicial
requiring

See S & G: Iverson.

To adopt Appellant's position would allow any individual to
completely by-pass administrative processes and not seek any review
or hearing within an agency. It would prevent an agency from using
its expertise or from reviewing its decisions in the light of an
individual's claims, and it would allow the "person aggrieved" to
go directly into court. This would significantly burden the court
system and require the courts to become engaged in judicial
determination

of

administrative

decisions

that

may

involve

substantial "administrative discretion" - discretion which is to be
exercised by the administrative agency, not a court.
CONCLUSION
Appellant failed to request a hearing or otherwise avail
himself of any of the administrative remedies or review.

Such

inaction constitutes a failure to exhaust his administrative
9

remedies, a waiver of his right to seek review, and the trial court
lacked jurisdiction and authority to judicially review the agency
action.

Appellee therefore requests that this Court affirm the

trial court's order dismissing the petition for review.
DATED this (<y^

day of May, 1994.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

THOM D. ROBERTS
Assistant Attorney General
Public Affairs Division
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of
the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE, postage prepaid, this {ry
May, 1994, to the following:
J. FRANKLIN ALLRED
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
321 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
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ADDENDUM

41-2-130. Chemical test for driving under the influence
Temporary license — Hearing and decision
Suspension and fee — Judicial review.
(1) (a) When a peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a person
may be violating or has violated Section 41-6-44, the peace officer may, in
connection with arresting the person, request that the person submit to a
chemical test or tests to be administered in compliance with the standards under Section 41-6-44.10.
(b) In this section, a reference to Section 41-6-44 includes any similar
local ordinance adopted in compliance with Subsection 41-6-43(1).
(2) The peace officer shall advise a person prior to the person's submission
to a chemical test that a test result indicating a violation of Section 41-6-44
shall, and the existence of a blood alcohol content sufficient to render the
person incapable of safely driving a vehicle may, result in suspension or revocation of the person's license to operate a motor vehicle.
(3) If the person submits to a chemical test and the test results indicate a
blood or breath alcohol content in violation of Section 41-6-44, or if the officer
makes a determination, based on reasonable grounds, that the person is otherwise in violation of Section 41-6-44, the officer directing administration of the
test or making the determination shall serve on the person, on behalf of the
division, immediate notice of the division's intention to suspend the person's
license to operate a vehicle.
(4) (a) When the officer serves immediate notice on behalf of the division
he shall:
(i) take the Utah license certificate or permit, if any, of the operator;
(ii) issue a temporary license certificate effective for only 29 days;
and
(iii) supply to the operator, on a form to be approved by the division, basic information regarding how to obtain a prompt hearing
before the division,
(b) A citation issued by the officer may, if approved as to form by the
division, serve also as the temporary license certificate.
(5) The peace officer serving the notice shall send to the division within five
days after the date of arrest and service of the notice:
(a) the person's license certificate;
(b) a copy of the citation issued for the offense;
(c) a signed report on a form approved by the division indicating the
chemical test results, if any; and
(d) any other basis for the officer's determination that the person has
violated Section 41-6-44.
(6) (a) Upon written request, the division shall grant to the person an opportunity to be heard within 29 days after the date of arrest. The request
shall be made within ten days of the date of the arrest.
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(b) A hearing, if held, shall be before the division in the county in
which the arrest occurred, unless the division and the person agree that
the hearing may be held in some other county.
(c) The hearing shall be documented and shall cover the issues of:
(i) whether a peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe the
person was operating a motor vehicle in violation of Section 41-6-44;
(ii) whether the person refused to submit to the test; and
(iii) the test results, if any.
(d) In connection with a hearing the division or its authorized agent
may administer oaths and may issue subpoenas for the attendance of
witnesses and the production of relevant books and papers.
(e) One or more members of the division may conduct the hearing.
(1) Any decision Ynade after a hearing before any number of the members of the division is as valid as if made after a hearing before the full
membership of the division.
(g) After the hearing, the division shall order whether the person's
license to operate a motor vehicle be suspended or not.
(7) (a) A first suspension, whether ordered or not challenged under this
subsection, is for a period of 90 days, beginning on the 30th day after the
date of the arrest.
(b) A second or subsequent suspension under this subsection is for a
period of one year, beginning on the 30th day after the date of arrest.
(8) (a) The division shall assess against a person, in addition to any fee
imposed under Subsection 41-2-112(15), a fee under Section 41-2-103,
which shall be paid before the person's diriving privilege is reinstated, to
cover administrative costs. This fee shall be cancelled if the person obtains an unappealed division hearing or court decision that the suspension was not proper.
(b) A person whose license has been suspended by the division under
this subsection may file a petition within 30 days after the suspension for
a hearing on the matter which, if held, is governed by Section 41-2-131.
History: C. 1953, 41-2-19.6, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 99, § 6; 1987, ch. 129, § 2; renumbered by L. 1987, ch. 137, § 30; 1990, ch. 30,
* 6; 1992, ch. 21, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment, effective Apnl 23, 1990, redesignated
the former second and third sentences of Subsection (3) as present Subsection (4), former
Subsection (4) as present Subsections (5)(a) to
(5)(d), former Subsection (5) as present Subsection (6), the second sentence in former Subsection (5Kb) as present Subsections (6)(c)(i) to
(6)(c)(in), the former third and fourth sentences of former Subsection (5Kb) as present
Subsections (€)(d) and (6Xe), former Subsection
(5)(c) as present Subsections (6)(D and (6)(g),
and former Subsections (5)(d) and (5)(e) as

present Subsections (7), (8)(a), and (8Kb), substituted "Subsection 41-2-112(14)" for "Subsection 41-2-112(6)" in the first sentence in
present Subsection (8)(a), and made stylistic
changes
The 1992 amendment, effective April 27,
1992, in Subsection (4) added the (a) and (b)
designations, redesignating former Subsections (4)(a) to (c) as Subsections (4)(a)(i) to (in),
in Subsections (4)(a)(n) and (6)(a) substituted
"29 days" for "30 days", subdivided Subsection
(7), substituted "30th day" for "31st day"m
both subsections, and substituted "one year"
for "120 days"m Subsection (7Kb), and m Subsection (8Ka) substituted "41-2-112(15)" for
"41-2-112(14)."
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41-2-131. Judicial review of license cancellation, revocation or suspension.
(1) Any person denied a license or whose license has been cancelled, suspended, or revoked by the department may seek judicial review of the department's order.
(2) Venue for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings is in the
district court in the county where the person resides. Persons not residing in
the state shall file in Salt Lake County or the county where the offense occurred which resulted in the cancellation, suspension, or revocation.
History: L. 1933, ch. 45, & 20; 1935, ch. 47,
I 2; C. 1943, 57-4-23; L. 1983, ch. 99, § 7; C.
1953, 41-2-20; renumbered by L. 1987, ch.
137, ft 31; 1987, ch. 161, § 138; 1987 (1st S.S.),
ch. 8, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment, by Chapter 137, renumbered this section
which formerly appeared as § 41-2-20, substituted "division" for "department" throughout
the section, divided the section into Subsections (1) and (2), and rewrote the section to the
extent that a detailed analysis is impracticable.

The 1987 amendment, by Chapter 161, effective January 1,1988, rewrote the existing language and designated it as Subsection (1), and
added Subsection (2).
Meaning of "department". — See note under same catchline following § 41-2-118.
Legislative Intent — Laws 1987 (1st S.S.),
ch. 8, § 6 states the legislative intent that
§ 41-2-131 be superseded by the provisions of
§ 41-2-20 (now this section) in Laws 1987,
Chapter 161, when that act becomes effective
January 1, 1988.
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53-3-223. Chemical test for driving under the influence — Temporary license — Hearing and decision — Suspension and fee
— Judicial review.
(1) (a) If a peace officer has reasonable grounds to
believe that a person may be violating or has
violated Section 41-6-44, prohibiting the operation of a vehicle with a certain blood or breath
alcohol concentration and driving under the influence of any drug, alcohol, or combination of a
drug and alcohol, the pe;ace officer may, in connection with arresting the person, request that
the person submit to a chemical test or tests to be
administered in compliance with the standards
under Section 41-6-44.10.
(b) In this section, a reference to Section
41-6-44 includes any similar local ordinance
adopted in compliance with Subsection
41-6-43(1).
(2) The peace officer shall advise a person prior to
the person's submission to a chemical test that a test
result indicating a violation of Section 41-6-44 shall,
and the existence of a blood alcohol content sufficient
to render the person incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle may, result in suspension or revocation of
the person's license to drive a motor vehicle.
(3) If the person submits to a chemical test and the
test results indicate a blood or breath alcohol content
in violation of Section 41-6-44, or if the officer makes
a determination, based on reasonable grounds, that
the person is otherwise in violation of Section
41-6-44, the officer directing administration of the
test or making the determination shall serve on the
person, on behalf of the division, immediate notice of
the division's intention to suspend the person's license to drive a motor vehicle.
(4) (a) When the officer serves immediate notice
on behalf of the division he shall:
(i) take the Utah license certificate or permit, if any, of the driver;
(ii) issue a temporary license certificate
effective for only 29 days; and
(iii) supply to the driver, on a form to be
approved by the division, basic information
regarding how to obtain a prompt hearing
before the division,
(b) A citation issued by the officer may, if approved as to form by the division, serve also as
the temporary license certificate.
(5) The peace officer serving the notice 6hall send
to the division within five days after the date of arrest and service of the notice:
(a) the person's license certificate;
(b) a copy of the citation issued for the offense;
(c) a signed report on a form approved by the
division indicating the chemical test results, if
any; and
(d) any other basis for the officer's determination that the person has violated Section 41-6-44.
(6) (a) Upon written request, the division shall
grant to the person an opportunity to be heard
within 29 days after the date of arrest. The request to be heard shall be made within ten days
of the date of the arrest.
(b) A hearing, if held, shall be before the division in the county in which the arrest occurred,
unless the division and the person agree that the
hearing may be held in some other county.

53-3-224

(c) The hearing shall be documented and shall
cover the issues of:
(i) whether a peace officer had reasonable
grounds to believe the person was driving a
motor vehicle in violation of Section 41-6-44;
(ii) whether the person refused to submit
to the test; and
s;
(iii) the test results, if any.
(d) (i) In connection with a hearing the divi
sion or its authorized agent:
(A) may administer oaths and may issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and the production of relevant
books and papers;
(B) may issue subpoenas for the attendance of necessary peace officers.
(ii) The division shall pay witness fees and
mileage from the Transportation Fund in accordance with the rates established in Section 2-15-4.
(e) One or more members of the division may
conduct the hearing.
(f) Any decision made after a hearing before
any number of the members of the division is as
valid as if made after a hearing before the full
membership of the division.
(g) After the hearing, the division shall order
whether the person's license to drive a motor vehicle is suspended or not.
(h) If the person for whom the hearing is held
fails to appear before the division as required in
the notice, the division shall order whether the
person's license to drive a motor vehicle is suspended or not.
(7) (a) A first suspension, whether ordered or not
challenged under this subsection, is for a period
of 90 days, beginning on the 30th day after the
date of the arrest.
(b) A second or subsequent suspension under
this subsection is for a period of one year, beginning on the 30th day after the date of arrest.
(8) (a) The division shall assess against a person,
in addition to any fee imposed under Subsection
53-3-205(14) for driving under the influence, a
fee under Section 53-3-105 to cover administrative costs, which shall be paid before the person's
driving privilege is reinstated. This fee shall be
cancelled if the person obtains an unappealed division hearing or court decision that the suspension was not proper.
(b) A person whose license has been suspended
by the division under this subsection may file a
petition within 30 days after the suspension for a
hearing on the matter which, if held, is governed
by Section 53-3-224.
iss3
53-3-224. Filing a petition for hearing — Judicial review of license cancellation, revocation, or suspension — Scope of review.
(1) A person denied a license or whose license has
been cancelled, suspended, or revoked by the division
may seek judicial review of the division's order.
(2) (a) Venue for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings is in the district court in the
county where the person resides.
(b) Persons not residing in the state shall file
in Salt Lake County or the county where the offense occurred, which resulted in the cancellation, suspension, or revocation.
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